Sunday, June 23, 2013

Kabajaa Hundeeffama SBO Waggaa 25ffaa Giddu Gala Mooraa Leenjii WBOtti

Saturday, June 22, 2013

Sudan’s Bashir leaves door open for re-election, backs Ethiopia’s dam

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June 21, 2013, (KHARTOUM) - The Sudanese president, Omer Hassan al-Bashir has hinted today that he could run for re-election in the upcoming presidential elections on the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) ticket.
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Sudan’s President Omer Hassan al-Bashir (REUTERS/Mohammed Dabbous)
Last March, Bashir reiterated his past intentions to step down at the end of his term in 2015 saying that Sudan is in need of “fresh blood” and that he spent enough time in power.
At the time several officials, including Bashir’s second vice-president al-Haj Adam Youssef, said that it is not up to Bashir to make a decision on his political future but the NCP.
Al-Bashir, who was addressing the NCP’s Shura Council seventh session on Friday, said that the media made conclusions on the issue of his candidacy without being fully informed adding that his re-election will be determined by the NCP’s General Convention and the Shura Council.
The head of the NCP’s Shura Council, Abu Ali Majzoub, on his part asserted that the NCP will nominate Bashir again in 2015.
“We will not approve any candidate other than Bashir”, and addressed Bashir saying “We will only accept you, and we want you to continue holding the torch”.
Bashir said that the NCP will review its statute in preparation for the 2015 general elections and urged the opposition parties to get ready for the polls instead of working overthrow the government.
He went on to say that if the opposition aims at organizing mass street protests with the aim of having army will take its side "we tell them that we are not the Socialist Union (SU)".
The Sudanese leader was referring to the SU which was the ruling party during the regime of Sudan’s ex-president Gaafar Al-Nmeiri who was deposed after a popular uprising in April 1985 prompting the army to abandon him.
On the economic front, Bashir pointed out that the government’s tab for subsidizing fuel, wheat, and electricity amounts to 14 billion pound SDG ($ 3.2 billion), while the government budget is 25 billion pound SDG ($ 6.4 billion).
Last year, the government launched a package of tough austerity measures, including scaling back fuel subsidies to close a fiscal gap, sparking short-lived protests.
Earlier this month, Sudan’s minister of finance and national economy Ali Mahmoud Abdel-Rasool urged the parliament to authorize gradual lifting of subsidies in order to reduce inflation.
Sudan’s finances have tightened since oil-rich South Sudan seceded from the north in July 2011. The new state contained 75% of the country’s pre-partition oil reserves.
Bashir also spoke of the new constitution that is being formulated and said that government is consulting several stakeholders so that the law of the land accommodates all political forces “except those who refuse”.
The opposition vowed not to take part in the process unless the NCP agrees to cede power and form a transitional government that prepares the country for elections.
Sudan is currently governed by an interim constitution which was ratified following signing the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with South Sudan rebels.
Bashir stressed that Sudan will continue its fight against the world which is he said controlled by the Zionist alliances and scoffed at the concept of “international justice” saying it is run by the U.S.
“We continue to exist against their will” said Bashir who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on genocide charges related to the Darfur conflict that broke out in 2033.
The Sudanese president acknowledged that his government had in the past provided support for rebel groups fighting the government of South Sudan.
“We will not deny that we used to arm and support the southern opposition as South Sudan does [now to Sudanese rebels], however we ceased our support after signing of the cooperation agreements”.
In September of last year, both Sudan and South Sudan signed a series of cooperation agreements, which covered oil, citizenship rights, security issues, banking, border trade among others.
Last March, the two countries signed an implementation matrix for these cooperation agreements.
Earlier this month Sudan’s president ordered halting the flow of Juba’s oil through Sudan’s territory. He said the decision was in response to Juba’s continued support to rebels battling Khartoum.
The move was seen as a major setback to the agreements.

DAM BENEFICIAL to EGYPT

In his first public endorsement for the controversial Ethiopian renaissance dam, Bashir said that the dam “will not stop the water from Egypt” and added that it will only be used for electricity generation, calling for continuation of consultation among all concerned parties.
He acknowledged the “sensitivity” of the water issue for Egypt, saying that Sudan and Egypt’s water shares will not be impacted during the dam filling period.
The Sudanese president also expressed doubt the Nile Basin Initiative (Known as Entebbe agreement), which he said “ came from the World Bank not from the Nile Basin countries.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, formerly known as the Millennium Dam is being constructed on the Blue Nile 40km from the Sudanese border.
Egypt and Sudan had previously argued that the construction of the dam would negatively affect their water shares and insisted the project should be blocked, calling on international donors against funding it.
Egypt believes its “historic rights” to the Nile are guaranteed by two treaties from 1929 and 1959 which allow it 87 percent of the Nile’s flow and give it veto power over upstream projects.
But a new deal (Entebbe agreement) was signed in 2010 by other Nile Basin countries, including Ethiopia, allowing them to work on river projects without Cairo’s prior agreement.

12th Day Straight Demonstration by Oromo Refugees in Egypt in front of the UNHCR Cairo


Thursday, June 20, 2013

Joint Statetment of ULFO and UAM-OLF

UNITED LIBERATION FORCES OF OROMIYAA (ULFO)
United Activists and
Liberation FrontMembers of the Oromo
 (UAM-OLF)
 June 16, 2013
Joint Statement
 Deeply concerned about the escalating state terrorism that the TPLF led regime of Ethiopia has been lately perpetrating on the people of Oromiyaa and the present precarious state of the Oromo national liberation struggle, the United Liberation Forces of Oromiyaa (ULFO) and the United Activists and Members of the Oromo Liberation Front (UAM-OLF) initiated joint sessions meant to assess the extent and implication of the TPLF all-rounded attacks on the Oromo people and explore ways and means that could help unite the Oromo liberation organizations and put the struggle on the right trajectory– one that reassures the salvation of the Oromo people from the wanton destruction by the TPLF.
 We, ULFO and UAM-OLF, held a series of meetings and discussed a range of issues. The salient issues that were given a special focus in the discussion include: (1) The heinous crimes of the TPLF-led regime and the present state of the Oromo nation, (2) the growing public apathy and cynicism on the unity of purpose among Oromo liberation forces, and (3) major bottlenecks that are exceedingly restricting the development of the Oromo liberation struggle, and (4) redress mechanisms that can extricate the struggle from recurring setbacks. After extensive deliberation on the issues, the following joint statement has been released:
Duly taking a stock of the crimes of the TPLF-led regime of Ethiopia has committed on the Oromo people and their implications on the present political, economic, and social conditions of the Oromo nation, ULFO and UAM-OLF have stated that the regime:
 •      Has made the situation of the nation in all spheres of life quite abysmal and it is relentlessly working to even further deteriorate their situation; relentlessly working to even further deteriorate their situation;
 •      Has completely marginalized the Oromos from having any stake in the political affairs of their nation by further shrinking even the token political space it has accorded its own proxy organization – the OPDO;
 •      Has strangulated the economic life line of the Oromo so much so that an abject poverty has overwhelmed the people to unprecedented degree;
 •      Has evicted the Oromo people from their ancestral land, from both urban centers and rural areas, at an alarming rate and leased or sold their land to trans- national corporations;
 •      Has repeatedly fomented inter-ethnic conflicts that took heavy tolls on human life and property of Oromo communities; for instance, the recent conflict that displaced the Oromos of Anniyyaa, Jaarsoo, and Mi’eessoo districts in Eastern Hararge is a case in point.
 •      Has escalated environmental degradation in Oromiya (in some cases by deliberately destroying a rare natural forest stock in Oromiya) like the one recently decimated in Illuu Abbaaboora Zone – the UNESCO- Registered Yayu Coffee Forest Biosphere Reserve;
 •      Has arrested the economic and social development of Oromiya by massively incarcerating the most productive demographic group throughout Oromiya and by terrorizing the bulk of the population and distracting them from engaging in development activities;
•      Has caused hundreds of thousands to flee their country and suffer in foreign lands, particularly in the neighbouring countries and in the Middle East, where survival for many proved to be utterly difficult;
 •      Has generally targeted and declared on the Oromo people a silent war of ethnic cleansing that the international community seems to have failed to notice;
 We condemn in stern terms the TPLF-led regime of Ethiopia for all crimes it has committed on the people of Oromiya. We call upon the world community to heed to appeals of the Oromo people and act in a morally responsible manner.
 Having reflected on the wanton aggression of the Ethiopian regime on the Oromo, ULFO and UAM-OLF have cogently recognized that the Oromo nation would not have been in such a dire state had the Oromo political forces put their political powerhouse in order. In light of this glaring fact, we would like to call upon all stakeholders to work towards the evolution of a untied and an effectively organized and led Oromo national liberation struggle.
 Recognizing the basis of cynicism of the Oromo public on the unity of the Oromo political organizations, ULFO and UAM-OLF have called upon:
 •      All independent Oromo political organizations to match their words with concrete deeds and earn the trust of the Oromo public;
 •      All organized Oromo civil societies (social organizations, religious institutions, business communities, academic associations, community organizations etc.) both at home and abroad to constructively engage all political forces to seriously and demonstratively work towards unity;
 •      The broad Oromo public, as the stakeholder in the political affairs of the nation, to significantly elevate its active engagement in the national liberation struggle and bring about the much desired outcome of the struggle- the liberation of Oromiya;
 •      The Oromo intellectuals not to remain aloof at this critical juncture when the nation desperately looks for profound solutions for its critical problems from its critical mass – the learned ones;
 •      All who level critics from the sideline on Oromo liberation forces of all stripes to redirect their energy and positively contribute to the national cause by directly involving in an organized political engagement and offer pragmatic solutions to the admittedly frustrating state of the Oromo liberation struggle.
 Understanding that the road-block that has impeded the progress of the Oromo national struggle so far is the lack of genuine political will to fundamentally and collectively address the prevailing political gridlock of the nation, we appeal to all Oromo political forces to give a somber thought to this burning issue and prepare for an open political engagement that ultimately help effectively contain the challenge of our time.
 ULFO and UAM-OLF on their part have committed themselves and come up with a mechanism that can redress the issue of unity of purpose among the Oromo liberation forces and eventually put the struggle on a better footing. Cognizant of the fact that all other forces are currently working along the same line, ULFO and UAM-OLF have commended all for such a noble effort and demanded that attempts along unification of forces be carried out in a more expeditious and coherent manner.
 UNITY IS STRENGTH !
 The United Liberation Forces of Oromiyaa (ULFO)
 The United Activists and Members of the Oromo Liberation Front (UAM-OLF)

Qeerroo.org: GGO 2013 Irratti “Hamma Oromiyaan Walaboomtutti Qabsoon Oromoo Itti Fufa” Jedhu J/ Dani’el Dafaa

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

The Grand Renaissance Dam crisis: The available choices

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Wed, 19/06/2013 - 17:10
   
Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr has held intensive talks in Ethiopia's capital Adis Ababa over the ongoing Grand Renaissance Dam crisis, days after the Ethiopian parliament approved the Entebbe Agreement on the redistribution of River Nile water. The development had only added fuel to the fire in a crisis that has seen Cairo recently waive military action while an Ethiopian government spokesperson has said the project is non-negotiable.
In a report,  entitled "Egypt's Limited Military Options to Stop an Ethiopian Dam Project," Stratfor Global Intelligence assesses the difficulties Egypt's air forces could encounter in the event of a direct military strike on the dam. It argues that the Egyptin army lacks the sufficient aerial refuelling capabilities that would allow its fighters to fly the long distances to Ethiopia. This suggests Egypt would have to rely on Sudan as a staging point for a blitzkrieg strike. The Grand Renaissance Dam is only 12 kilometres from Sudan's borders.
However, the report explains, an indirect military solution is contingent on Sudan's approval because it would expose Ethiopia's next-door neighbour to potentially dire consequences that could amount to all-out war. This makes a Sudanese agreement for Egypt to launch military sorties from its territory much less likely.
Ruling out military action leaves Egypt with less violent and less expensive options. These could include backing Ethiopian opposition groups or investing in religious or ideological conflicts between radical Islamist groups - most active in Somalia and Eritrea - and Adis Ababa's Orthodox Christian regime. These groups could be co-opted to pressure the Ethiopian government by launching targeted operations into the heart of the country.
Egypt might also consider supporting separatist ethnicities such as the Oromia tribes who for a long time now have attacked perceived marginalisation and been represented by armed groups seeking to claim their rights by force.
As well as the Oromia, Ethiopia's Ogaden region is home to a Somali-origin majority where several radical groups are looking to break free from Ethiopia and join Somalia instead.
The diplomatic route, although it would not bring about an immediate solution, will remain an important "soft" option for Egypt's leadership. Its slow impact and dependance on timing might make it the best possible scenario. Egypt might, for example, resort to the United Nations Security Council or the International Court of Justice. It could also opt for political means such as mediation by parties with influence over Ethiopia - namely the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Egypt could also approach countries funding the Ethiopian dam, including China and Italy.
International precedent for this route should be cause for encouragement. The International Court of Justice, in its most recent adjudications on water disputes between Hungary and Slovakia in 1997; and Uruguay and Argentina in 2010, concluded that regional treaties, including those on international rivers, should be irrevocable because they are inherited by consecutive governments.
This "soft" approach is the most subtle but the most difficult at the same time, due to considerations of time and lack of trust between parties involved in the conflict. Despite those challenges, this option remains necessary for handling any future disputes over water issues between the two countries.
In this context, Egypt could engage in the Ethiopian project at the levels of funding, implementation and consultancy, turning it into a principal partner. That would allow Egypt to ensure that the project is executed according to technical specifications that take into account environmental considerations, sustainable development and continued water flow, thereby serving the interests of all parties.
The piece is a summary of an analysis by Al-Masry Studies and Information Centre

Egypt: Threats Over Nile Waters Backfire As Promise of War Is Not Credible

ANALYSIS
Photo: Marc Veraart/Flickr
A man weaving cotton by hand near the Blue Nile in Ethiopia (file photo).
Egypt's threats towards Ethiopia and its Grand Renaissance dam project on the Blue Nile seem to be backfiring on all sides. On 3rd June, President Morsi, beset by growing internal problems, had a clever idea. His government would drum up an external threat, and call for internal unity. He invited leading Egyptian politicians to a meeting to discuss the issue of Ethiopia's "diversion" of the Blue Nile - the source of most of Egypt's water. Never mind that the supposed "diversion" was simply a temporary rerouting of the river by some 500 meters from its normal channel.
President Morsi called the meeting to review the impact of the dam (if any) on Egypt's water supply. Strangely enough, he failed to inform the politicians that their meeting was being broadcast live on TV, which encouraged them to engage in a favourite pastime - the repetition old myths of their ownership of the Nile waters and willingness to fight for Egypt's right to control them.
He may have also failed to inform his politicians that three days earlier an independent panel of experts (including members from Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan) had reported the findings of a yearlong study, that the hydropower dam would not significantly reduce the flow of water reaching Sudan and Egypt.
With Egypt's senior politicians discussing a potential military response, Ethiopia was not amused. President Morsi then appeared to put on a statesmanlike show of conciliation and calm. Later, however, Egypt issued a demand that Ethiopia stop construction of the dam, and warned on Monday June 10th that "all options are open."
Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn responded, vowing that "nothing and no one will stop the dam's construction" and downplayed the threat of conflict. Ethiopia's Parliament also voted unanimously to ratify the new Nile Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), already signed by six Nile basin states. Congo and South Sudan have also announced plans to join the new pact - the result of decade-long negotiations, which will create a commission to oversee Nile projects and ensure the equitable allocation of Nile waters among the basin states.
Ethiopia had earlier postponed ratification for a year to accommodate Egypt's request for time until an elected government was in place, and to allow the team of experts, including those from Egypt and Sudan, to inspect the dam and satisfy themselves that it would not reduce their water supply.
Meanwhile, efforts to mobilize the Egyptian public behind Morsi have had mixed results, kicking off an uproar in the country's independent media. Critics have argued that carrying the meeting live on TV showed Morsi's mismanagement of a national security issue. Reform campaigner and opposition leader, Nobel Peace Laureate Mohamed El Baradei, called on Morsi to apologize to Ethiopia and Sudan on behalf of the Egyptian people for what was said during the meeting.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr also got in on the act, saying he would go to Addis Ababa to discuss the dam and, according to Reuters, vowing not to give up "a single drop of water from the Nile." Ethiopia, however, had already refused Egypt's request to stop work on the dam as a "non-starter, and dismissed threats from Cairo of 'sabotage' and 'destabilization' noting that such attempts by Egypt under its previous military rulers had failed.
The countries that share the Nile have long disagreed over the use of its waters. This has led to fears, largely promoted by Egypt, that the disputes could boil over into war. Since the late 1970s, when Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, it was permitted to place senior Egyptian officials in strategic positions in the World Bank and other international agencies. These included those concerned with international water issues such as the UN Environment Programme, and of course, international peace issues.
This enabled Cairo to implement a strategy of discouraging international loans to upstream Nile basin countries for development of water infrastructure without Egyptian permission. The justification was always that such loans would endanger peace as Egypt might be forced to take action in view of its "total dependency" on the Nile waters. If Egypt said it needed all the Nile waters, it was not for the international financial institutions to question. This of course encouraged Egypt's verbal bellicosity, as did the international financial community's habit of accepting, or pretending to accept, this verbal bellicosity at face value.
In the meantime, Getachew Reda, a spokesman for Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, was quoted by Associated Press in Addis Ababa, pointing out that "If there are still people who still think they can do the kind of things which leaders in the past such as Mubarak were not able to successfully launch, then they are entitled to day-dreaming." In 2010 when the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, accused Egypt of aiding rebels against his government, Cairo denied the accusations, which Getachew described as "hard facts."
That Egypt would engage in open warfare is most unlikely. Egypt's long time ally Sudan has expressed its support for Ethiopia's Renaissance Dam which, besides not reducing the amount of water for the downstream countries, would actually benefit them. In effect, the dam's location in the depths of the Blue Nile Gorge, some 50 km from the Sudanese border, cannot be used for irrigation within Ethiopia, with no irrigable land within reach. The Renaissance Dam therefore poses no threat to Egypt's water supply. The threat it poses, is to Egypt's supposed hegemony over the Nile waters
Egypt's foreign policy has long been shaped by its quest for hegemony over the Nile and the Blue Nile in particular. It is based on the premise that Egypt must be strong enough to either dominate Ethiopia or to create conditions that prevent Ethiopia from building dams on the Blue Nile. With that aim, Egypt occupied the port of Massawa for some 20 years during 1865 and 1885, having leased it from the Ottoman Sultanate. In 1875 and 1876 Egypt's ruler launched a series of military expeditions against Ethiopia, led by Swiss and American mercenary officers resulting in humiliating defeats for Egypt at the battle of Gundet. Some four months later, during March 1876, some 12,000 Egyptian soldiers were annihilated by Ras Alula's Ethiopian forces at the Battle of Gura.
Egypt may need to be reminded that regimes may change, with military, economic and other capacities too, but geography remains the same. Egypt will always be the downstream country. It may also need to be reminded of the limitations of its economic and military capacity and particularly its ability to project that military capacity over long distances and provide it with the necessary economic and logistical support. So far, its capacity appears to be greater using the tactic of destabilization with non-state actors
In recognition of its somewhat vulnerable strategic position, Egypt has used its political, economic and military strength to influence developments within other riparian states. This has included attempts to exert pressure on upper riparian states proposing to develop their Nile water resources, through threats of military action, and providing support to rebel groups.
While a war over the Nile waters was always unlikely, the recent political and economic turmoil in Egypt and the Arab region has made it still less feasible. There is a need for new faces to come forward, for a new dialogue, and to seek the win-win solutions needed by all the Nile basin peoples.
What is certain is that to support their rapidly growing and youthful populations, all of the basin states need to focus on urbanization, industrialization and job creation. This will require rapid development of their sustainable energy resources and acceptance of the reality that water is an economic resource that they cannot afford to waste. The Renaissance Dam and the 6000 megawatts of power that it will produce will make an important contribution to all the Nile basin states, and ultimately, to regional economic integration, peace and security.
Seifulaziz Milas is author of Sharing the Nile: Egypt, Ethiopia and the Geo-Politics of Water forthcoming from Pluto Books, London, July 2013.
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